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Howard: Our Litigious Society

OUR LITIGIOUS SOCIETY*
A.E. DICK HOWARD**
I want to begin by quoting what a French traveler had to
say about American lawyers two hundred years ago. You may
assume I mean Tocqueville because he is often quoted for his
commentaries on American life, but I have in mind St. John de
Cr~vecoeur, who wrote Letters from an American Farmer,1 published in 1784. One of his letters was written from South Carolina. It had this to say:
The three principal classes of inhabitants are lawyers, planters,
and merchants; this is the province which has afforded to the
first the richest spoils, for nothing can exceed their wealth,
their power, and their influence. They have reached the ne
plus ultra of worldly felicity; no plantation is secured, no title
is good, no will is valid, but what they dictate, regulate, and
approve. The whole mass of provincial property is become tributary to this society, which, far above priests and bishops, disdain to be satisfied with the poor Mosaical portion of the
tenth. I appeal to the many inhabitants who, while contending
perhaps for their right to a few hundred acres, have lost by the
mazes of the law their whole patrimony. These men are more
properly lawgivers than interpreters of the law and have united
here, as well as in most other provinces, the skill and dexterity
of the scribe with the power and ambition of the prince; who
can tell where this may lead in a future day? The nature of our
laws and the spirit of freedom, which often tends to make us
litigious, must necessarily throw the greatest part of the property of the colonies into the hands of these gentlemen. In another century, the law will possess in 2the north what now the
church possesses in Peru and Mexico.
* 0 1987 A.E. Dick Howard

** White Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs, University of Virginia.
B.A., 1954, University of Richmond; LL.B., 1961, University of Virginia; M.A., 1965, Ox-

ford University. Transcribed by the editors from Professor Howard's remarks keynoting
the symposium, The Federal Courts: The Next 100 Years, on September 19, 1986.
1. J.H. ST. JOHN DE CRPVECOEUR, LErTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER AND SKETCHES
OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Penguin 1986) (London 1783) [hereinafter LE-rRsj.
2. J.H. ST. JOHN DE CRaVECOEUR, Letter IX: Descriptionof Charles Town: Thoughts
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This is a rather pessimistic picture of what lawyers had become
not only in the province of South Carolina but in the American
nation generally. Those words were published in 1782, and we
raise the question this morning, two hundred years later,
whether we have indeed come to the state that St. John de
Crevecoeur predicted.
While I embark upon a topic about which the popular press
and media have had much to say, Chief Justice Burger has inveighed frequently against the costliness, the destructiveness,
and the inefficiency of our legal system. He says he sees "hordes
of lawyers, hungry as locusts."' The figures are, I suspect, very
familiar ones: in twenty years time, the number of lawyers in
America has doubled, and the number of law students in
America has multiplied by four times. According to Commerce
Department figures, in 1985 the law "industry," if I may call it
that, counted as its receipts about $54 billion. That is more than
the hotel industry made by $10 or $12 billion, far more than the
movie industry made, less, of course, than health, but still it is a
substantial share of the gross national product.
As we talk about litigiousness, let me pose four questions.
First, how litigious have we in fact become? Second, what factors have encouraged litigiousness? Third, if one sees this as a
problem, what responses might one make? Last, what would be
the appropriate standards for evaluating those responses?
The first question-how litigious, in fact, are we-is a really
tough one. One hears comparative figures suggesting that Japan
and other countries use far fewer lawyers than we do, and one
assumes that somehow we are more litigious than everyone else.
If one analyzes historical data, the data are fragmentary to be
sure. Studies of nineteenth-century St. Louis suggest that, on a
per capita basis, people in St. Louis went to court twice as often
in the nineteenth century as they do today. Another study, of
seventeenth-century Accomac County, Virginia, suggests that
the people of that day and time were four times as litigious in
proportion to population as would be true of American counties

on Slavery; On Physical Evil; A Melancholy Scene, in LmmrRS 166, 167-68.
3. Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, ABA Minor Disputes Resolution
Conference (May 27, 1977), reprintedin State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the House JudiciaryComm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1977).
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in the twentieth century.
If one turns from historical data to contemporary data, the
figures remain a bit elusive, especially if one considers state
courts. It is hard to compare the statistics from one state to another because the reporting is incomplete. Indeed, what does it
mean that "x" number of disputes are filed in a court? Many of
those disputes are disposed of by being withdrawn or settled,
and those that go to adjudication often really do not involve any
contest at all. In divorce cases, for example, the matter has been
largely settled and all that is needed from the court is an authoritative disposition. Perhaps the most telling figures, and
they relate directly to the focus of this Symposium, are those
which relate to federal courts because the figures are complete
and susceptible of comparison. Let me take as my benchmark
the last twenty-five years-the years 1960 through 1985. During
that period of time, the population of this country increased by
about thirty-two percent, from 180 million people to about 238
million people. During that same twenty-five year period, the
docket of the United States Supreme Court increased by approximately 227 percent.4 The number of civil filings in federal
district courts increased by about 469 percent, and the filings in
the United States Courts of Appeals increased by approximately
794 percent.5 One would expect, of course, some increase in percentage of cases based on population growth, but the difference
between thirty-two percent population increase and 794 percent
increase in filings in the courts of appeals is geometrical. Therefore, the raw figures suggest that something is going on-that,
whatever may have been the case in the nineteenth century, a
surge of filings has occurred in the last two or three decades,
especially in federal courts.
Another way of measuring the problem would be to look not

4. In the Supreme Court's October Term, 1960, 1940 new cases were filed with the
Supreme Court. 1961 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 218, table A-1 [hereinafter ADMIN. OFF. REP. preceded by
year]. In the October Term, 1985, 5158 cases were on the Supreme Court's docket; 745 of
these were carried over from the previous Term. 1986 ADMIN. OFF. REP. at 135, table A-1
(draft copy).
5. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, 58,293 cases were filed in federal district
courts, 1961 ADMIN. OFF. REP. at 234, table C-i, and 4204 appeals were filed with the
federal courts of appeals. Id. at 222, table B-1. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1985,
273,670 cases were filed in the district courts, 1985 ADMIN. OFF. REP. at 276, table C-i,
and 33,360 cases were appealed to the courts of appeals. Id. at 244, table B-1.
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at the raw figures, but at the kinds of cases that are filed. Here
one becomes anecdotal, and the media have picked up on many
of these examples. One reads about the case in which the Washington Redskins fans at a St. Louis football game were disappointed by the referee's call and filed a case in federal court
challenging that decision. Apparently, civil rights are caught up
even in what happens on the football field. I remember in the
1960s when every one of the ten federal judicial circuits had
cases challenging high school dress codes, specifically how long
boys' hair must or could be in those high school districts. The
circuits, as I recall, split five-to-five in those cases. The Supreme
Court never resolved that question. I recall Justice Black complaining that the federal courts had better things to do than to
decide how long boys' hair ought to be in high school. There are
other examples: clergy malpractice, academic standards, and
wrongful life suits. Causes of action are filed today that probably
would not have gone to court or would not have been the subject
of litigation even twenty or twenty-five years ago.
Let me not linger on the anecdotal because I think that is
very familiar to all of us. Let me pass instead to a somewhat
more thorough-going consideration of my second question: Assuming there is some phenomenon of litigiousness, what are the
factors in American life that prompt Americans to sue and to go
to court as frequently as they do?
One of the factors is surely institutional, including the activity of government itself. In the 1970s alone, there were some
seven new federal agencies created, such as EPA and OSHA.
The Federal Register in the past fifteen years has grown from
something like 10,000 pages annually to approximately 50,000
pages, a five-fold increase. Washington, D.C., is a lawyer's boom
town these days; I believe something on the order of 35,000 people belong to the D.C. Bar Association. There has been, during
this same period of time, the marked rise of the public interest
law firm. To be sure, public interest groups were litigating before
my benchmark year of 1960, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
being one, but the appearance of these firms became manifest in
the 1960s and covered a great many fields. What distinguishes
these firms, of course, is that they exist with litigation as their
purpose. They go to court to raise questions. It was during this
period that the growth of Legal Aid was spurred partly by
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Gideon v. Wainwright,6 the Supreme Court decision giving indigent defendants the right to demand lawyers in felony cases.
The creation of the Legal Services Corporation, of course, gave
more representation for the poor. These were some of the institutional factors.
Additionally, I think the courts themselves have played a
very essential role in increasing opportunities for litigation. Certainly, judges in the modern age appear disposed to a willingness
to fashion and explicate rights. Those rights sometimes are substantive rights, such as privacy and autonomy rights in cases like
Griswold v. Connecticut,7 Roe v. Wade,8 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird,9 or they may be procedural rights, such as the right to
have review of welfare agency decisions to discontinue entitlements. Beyond explicating rights, courts have shown a willingness in our time to fashion more sweeping remedies. In particular, judges have become very famous supervising public
institutions in institutional litigation cases. Two examples of
this are Judge Arthur Garrity in Boston and Judge Frank Johnson in Alabama. At one time Judge Johnson had so many cases
involving the State in his court that people down there used to
refer to him as the "real Governor of Alabama" as his court was
where policy was in fact being made. Therefore, from the traditional lawsuit, A suing B, one finds that frequently the paradigm
suit today is the public law litigation. This includes institutional
litigation involving class actions, sweeping remedies, and ongoing supervision in which judges, having handed down decrees,
then go into the business of administering and overseeing the
final results of those decrees. The courts also have devised new
standards of review. Perhaps the best example is the Supreme
Court's Brown v. Board of Education0 decision in which strict
scrutiny standards of review in equal protection cases was
spawned. In short, it seems to me that the modern judge, and
this often does not really depend on who put him on the bench,
displays a willingness to be a problem-solver. You lay a problem
before the bench, and the judge's reaction is that, if there is a

6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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problem, it should be solved.
We remember well the Warren Court from the sixties for its
judicial activism: one person, one vote; school desegregation; and
criminal justice. Now we embark upon the era of the Rehnquist
Court. If you look back over the seventeen years of the Burger
Court, it is apparent the predictions that the Burger Court
would somehow cut back on the activism of the Warren years
proved unfounded. For all the activist jurisprudence of the Warren era, the Burger Court found yet more things for judges to
do: abortion, capital punishment, gender discrimination, prison
cases, and commercial speech. The list of areas where even the
Warren Court had not gone or had barely gone and where the
Burger Court opened up new judicial terrain is really quite a
long one.
Let us not overlook Congress' role in all of this. Congress in
the modern age has created causes of action by way of federal
statutes or, in many cases, has simply passed unclear legislation,
leaving it for judges to interpret such a statute to determine, for
instance, whether a private party may sue by way of an implied
cause of action. If one were to sit in on legislative debates, congressional or otherwise, one might hear a legislator questioning
the constitutionality of a bill, and some other legislator will say,
"Well, do not worry about that. The courts will take care of it."
There is a passing-the-buck syndrome in the legislative branch.
Also, there has been a failure of the political branches to solve
problems with these problems finally winding up in the laps of
the courts. The states' unwillingness or inability to deal with desegregation certainly brought the federal courts into that picture
in a very broad way. The decline of the party system certainly
has had its impact. Also, we have watched with fascination as
black successes in the course of the civil rights movement during
the fifties and sixties were quickly and widely imitated by a
number of other groups-prisoners, women's rights groups, and
others.
Finally, among the factors that I find most fascinating-though I surely am not competent to judge-are the social
factors. Perhaps a sociologist or political historian ought to treat
these, but they ought not to be omitted. I would think the conditions of modern life have a lot to do with litigiousness. We do
live in a more complicated time. There are simply more opportunities for interaction and for conflict. Take the example of tech-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss3/3

6

1987]

Howard:
Our Litigious
Society
OUR LITIGIOUS
SOCIETY

nology. We would not have the so-called "right to die" cases,
such as Karen Ann Quinlan's case," unless we had the technology to keep people alive, at least in a technical sense, pending
resolution of the dispute. Thus, courts in Massachusetts, New
York, New Jersey, and others have had to deal with questions of
whether extraordinary measures should be discontinued. Modern technology in the medical field has given rise to widespread
expectations of what people think their doctors and hospitals
can do for them. If those expectations are not fulfilled, then
medical malpractice suits are the result. It seems to me that, in
a social sense, there is an unwillingness to accept or tolerate injuries that might have been accepted as part of the rough spots
in life in another time-an unwillingness to "lump it," so to
speak. Litigiousness is partly, I suppose, a result of the publicity
that is given to lawsuits and to awards in individual cases. Also,
there has been, I would submit, a rise of what one might call a
"rights" syndrome. A good example would be the spread of the
antidiscrimination principle, beginning with race as the most obvious application of that principle. That notion has spread to
any number of other areas-gender, national origin, religion,
physical or mental handicap, sexual orientation, and so forth. As
one turns to the extraordinarily knotty problems of affirmative
action, one finds played out once again the question of how
many groups should be entitled to what kinds of preferences.
There might be another social, even personal, kind of factor
at play. It is one that Judge Motley pointed out very well at a
dinner conversation we had last night. Individuals may well prefer to go to court than deal with a faceless bureaucracy. In a
court, whether you win or lose, at least you know with whom you
are dealing. When you go to court you come face to face with a
specific person in whose hands the resolution of your dispute
lies. Indeed, it may be a much quicker resolution than would be
true of a bureaucratic organization. When you deal with the Internal Revenue Service, for example, you do not know who is
finally handling the problem and you may never get a final
answer.
Beyond this, and here I touch the jurisprudential level, I
would think that one of the factors at play has been a changing

11. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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notion about the nature and function of law itself. We had once
upon a time the old Blackstonian myth about law: that judges
discovered law, or that judges reached into the heavens and
plucked down the standard and simply applied it to a case. We
have, of course, discarded that belief today, partly due to the
influence of positivism, for the notion that law is made by
human beings for solutions of problems. We also have had the
influence of legal realism, that movement in the twenties, thirties, and forties in this country, which emphasized the role of
the judge-what it is the judge does in making law. We have
divorced rather completely in American jurisprudence-I say
completely, but this may be returning-the old relation of law
and natural justice, where law and justice were seen to be a naturally interlocking mechanism. Perhaps we have done that because constitutional phrases such as due process or equal protection are a nice substitute. They certainly are as malleable and as
infinitely elastic as natural law ever was.
There may also be another social factor at play here: a shift
in American attitude to authority. The old authority centers
-the family, the school, the church, and so forth-simply seem
to have less command upon the obedience of American people.
Opinion polls suggest as much. Perhaps law and courts have become a substitute for those old authority centers. There certainly has been something of a decline in the sense of community; there is more confrontation and less accommodation. There
is more emphasis on legal formalities and procedures and less on
working out problems in an informal fashion. One of the men
who preceded me at this platform, a university president, surely
would testify to what any university president will know. Universities are not the kind of places they were twenty-five years
ago, when one did not draw codes of rights and responsibilities.
A university president does well to have his lawyer at his elbow
when he makes major policy decisions because universities, like
the society at large, are miniature bodies politic in which one
must think in legalistic terms of rights and responsibilities.
That is a short sketch of what strikes me as some of the
factors that are at play in American life.
Let me turn to my third question: assuming one judges
something to be going on, something we might call litigiousness,
and assuming one thinks that there is perhaps more of it than
there ought to be, what possible responses might one make to
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the problem? Here I am going to be fairly sketchy because it
strikes me that much of what will be taken up in this Symposium will deal with questions of responses, specifically in the
federal court context. Let me simply group these responses
under generic headings and suggest ways of thinking about the
problem.
Some of the responses or proposals that one might hear are
essentially technical, managerial, or organizational-for example, such things as dividing circuits. When the old Fifth Circuit
was divided into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, that was a
managerial response to the problem. Hiring court administrators
is another managerial response, which Chief Justice Burger has
supported. Also, the idea of creating specialized courts, such as a
tax court, is a specialized way of dealing with the managerial
side of the problem.
Second, one might deal with how attorneys must behave in
court. Proposals have either been made or adopted dealing with
such things as limiting the abuse of pretrial discovery, the endless dragging out of the discovery process in a way that may simply enhance the power of those who have the money to endure
that process.
Third, one can deal with the problem on a larger
plane-dealing with substantive law itself. One might, for example, abolish a substantive cause of action. If there is no cause of
action, the court has nothing to do. One could simply leave particular issues to private resolution. This is how the modern age
has dealt with the old cause of action of alienation of affection.
It used to be a cause of action, but it does not exist anymore.
Also, one might substitute legislative solutions for adjudication.
Workers' compensation surely would be the classic example. Another example would be no-fault proposals, which are often rejected or are adopted in a watered-down form. Deregulation
would he another approach. Trucking and airlines, of course,
have seen a good deal of this.
A fourth response, which may, no doubt, surface in one
form or another deals with the overarching question of how easy
it should be for people to go to court. This response is on the
border between substantive law and procedural law. It is what I
would call controlling access to the courts-what their jurisdiction and powers are. This response pertains to questions concerning the class action, standing, implied causes of action, and
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so forth. For example, one might deal with the question of expenses and costs of litigation. Who finally pays for fees and costs
obviously will affect very much what kind of cases are brought
and how often. Also, Congress has article III power, surely one of
the more contentious areas of dealing with court jurisdiction.
That article III power on its face seems quite sweeping, but, as
we know, there is a lot of uncharted territory here because
sweeping proposals to limit the courts' jurisdiction have typically been rejected. Certainly, many bills have been proposed
seeking to alter the jurisdiction of the courts, most notably on
questions like school prayer, abortion, and school busing. I
might say parenthetically that this route obviously is fraught
with some dangers, but it is certainly a part of the checklist.
Furthermore, one could set out to limit the courts' remedial
powers. This tool has been used sometimes. Perhaps the best example would be the federal laws that limit the granting of injunctions in labor cases, a device of some decades standing. Busing has been the subject of this kind of proposal, the thought
being that busing might be viewed as simply one remedy among
others to enforce the substantive constitutional right. Obviously,
once again this proposal is fraught with some significant implications for the constitutional right itself. Other proposals advocate
adjusting the relative role that federal and state courts play in
the federal system. There was a time in the sixties, during the
full flood of concern about civil rights, that state courts were
thought to be part of the problem. I think twenty years ago that
was not an unfair judgment. Twenty years later, however, I
would submit that state courts are far better able to function, to
manage problems, and to interpret rights than they had been in
the sixties. Therefore, perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at
questions like diversity jurisdiction and duplication in criminal
cases. Should diversity jurisdiction be abolished or at least modified? To what extent should one have recourse to habeas corpus
and collateral attack of state convictions? Finally, in dealing
with the courts, one might think about alternative forums such
as arbitration or mediation, proposals sometimes adopted at the
state level.
Last, in thinking about responses, and here one does emerge
onto a very broad plane, proposals for reform should address
other institutions as well as the courts. It may well be that the
litigation takes place in courts, but, by my analysis of the factors
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that give rise to litigiousness, much of the problem begins somewhere else, with what other institutions do and do not do.
Legal education is a candidate for study. The typical law
school curriculum, and I speak here as a professor who obviously
is part of that ongoing process, is one which inculcates subtly or
overtly certain attitudes and values about the norm in the litigation process. Most of us who teach in law schools teach from
case books that use appellate cases. There is an emphasis on litigation as a process of yielding answers and on appellate courts'
reasoning in resolving and answering those questions. It may
well be that law school curricula overemphasize the process of
litigation, that law schools are to the process of law in this country as television is to what goes on in the real world. Maybe the
curriculum fosters preoccupation with conflict and, therefore,
tends to overlook other ways of working out society's problems.
Second, one certainly can look at the health of political institutions and their procedures. Take Congress, for example.
There are times when one wonders if article I has not been written out of the Constitution. Congress often seems to be at a
standstill. One wishes that Congress would simply write statutes
in a way that one could read them and understand them. I may
not be the brightest lawyer around, but I certainly bog down in
them, and I suspect some others do as well.
State governments are also candidates" for revitalization,
and I am delighted to acknowledge the contributions of South
Carolina's Governor Dick Riley in this respect. He belongs to a
generation of governors, including Bruce Babbitt of Arizona,
Richard Snelling of Vermont, Charles Robb of Virginia, and
some others, who have exemplified the resurgence and renaissance of state government in America. I think state governments, like state courts, generally are in far better shape today
than they were twenty years ago. It may be coincidental that
states are now being asked to do and obliged to do more because
of the Reagan administration's incentives towards decentralization. Whether it be because they want to or because they are
being made to, I think the states are better able to handle
problems today.
Last, although this is beyond any prescription that a symposium like this can deal with, I would certainly mention thinking
about ways to reinvigorate the family, the church, and the
school. These are other social mechanisms where problems are

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art.
3
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

38

worked out. One cannot force solutions upon those institutions,
but judges and courts can be sensitive to and aware of how their
decisions will impact upon those institutions. In the arena of the
academic process, for example, if every final examination grade
were a potential lawsuit, it seems that both the courts and the
schools would be the losers.
Finally, I want to turn to my fourth question, one which is
fundamental. Assuming that one were to conclude that there is
too much litigiousness, that it is a problem, and that there ought
to be responses to it, I do not think that ends the inquiry. It
seems to me that one is obliged to fashion a set of criteria or
standards by which to judge those responses. Litigiousness,
whatever the problems associated with it, is by no means all bad.
I do not wish my remarks to be construed to be that, if there are
too many cases, too many lawsuits, and too many lawyers, one
can simply cut back in a wholesale manner. One surely can be
more sophisticated than that. Therefore, let me suggest, although in the confines of a brief talk one cannot be exhaustive,
that there are ways to think about standards.
Certain factors, I would submit, argue prima facie against
judicial intervention. I use "prima facie" to suggest a rebuttable
presumption that when these factors exist one should be slower
to urge courts to take on a particular problem. One factor I have
in mind is the occasion when the cost of the court's action is
excessive in relation to the benefits that one may perceive in the
adjudication. Lack of authoritative standards against which to
judge is another factor. I have recourse again to the world of
academics; the standards of scholarship are simply not very
amenable to resolution by judges. A third factor is the deleterious effect a court's action might have upon other institutions,
such as when a decision supplants family decisions or school decisions. This may weaken those institutions, and accordingly, society pays some price. Fourth, the complexity of the subject
matter may be a reason for hesitation. Medical malpractice may
take courts into areas that are simply so complex that, at some
point, this should be a cause for concern. Allocation of resources
ought, it seems to me, to be prima facie a legislative question.
The need for ongoing supervision ought to be a matter for concern as well.
Other competing factors may support judicial intervention
or the availability of access to courts. These would include the
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need for integrity or independence in a decision because an issue
ought to be worked out in some reasoned and principled way
that is not typically manifest in legislative decisions. There may
be a need for particularized consideration of a problem-looking
precisely at a set of facts and seeing how they ought to work
their way out, especially when one deals with fundamental
rights. Where a minority is involved, particularly those who are
powerless or unpopular as potential plaintiffs, I would err on the
side of access to courts. In that respect, courts are, in effect,
safety valves for what might otherwise be explosive resolutions
of problems.
Factors of this kind are, of course, subjective, and one could
complain rightly that the checklist is not going to help one finally decide which things should go to court and which should
not. Your list of fundamental rights might not be the same as
mine, just as Justice Peckham in 1905 thought liberty of contract was a constitutional right1 2 and Justice Blackmun in 1973
thought that the right to privacy was a fundamental right. 13 As
we debate litigiousness and weigh its cost, however, and we seek
to keep the uses of courts and law within some bounds, we
should not be blind to the gains that have been made precisely
because of increased recourse to the courts. It is hard to believe
that a nation that calls itself devoted to the principles of justice
would want to go back to the days when minorities were largely
shut out of the legal system, or, because of poverty, a deserving
citizen could not, in effect, have his or her fair day in court. We
should not overlook the gains that reliance on courts and on litigation have brought in areas such as freedom of conscience and
unfettered press, remedies against racial discrimination, personal privacy, and other important values. Therefore, if we are
to do some pruning, it seems to me that the pruning ought to be
selective. If too much law or too many lawsuits is a problem, let
us not lose sight of an equally important concern-too little justice. If litigiousness is a problem and remedies ought to be explored, any response should be tempered with moderation.
I opened with St. John de Crevecoeur. Let me close on what
may strike you as a mildly whimsical note by quoting from Sir

12. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 .See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Arthur Conan Doyle's Hound of the Baskervilles.14 This is not
usually referred to as one of the sources of legal authority, but I
invite you to think about the relevance of one particular passage.
This is a passage about Mr. Frankland, a neighbor of Sir Henry
Baskerville. Dr. Watson describes Mr. Franklin as follows:
His passion is for the British law, and he has spent a large fortune in litigation ....

Sometimes he will shut up a right of way

and defy the parish to make him open it. At others he will with
his own hands tear down some other man's gate and declare
that a path has existed there from time immemorial, defying
the owner to prosecute him for trespass. He is learned in old
manorial and communal rights, and he applies his knowledge
sometimes in favour of the villagers of Fernworthy and sometimes against them, so that he is periodically either carried in
triumph down the village street or else burned in effigy, according to his latest exploit. 15
Here is Frankland speaking of himself, talking to Watson:
FRANKLAND:

It is a great day for me, sir-one of the red-

letter days of my life ....

I have brought off a double event. I

mean to teach them in these parts that law is law, and that
there is a man here who does not fear to invoke it. I have established a right of way through the centre of old Middleton's
Park, slap across it, sir, within a hundred yards of his own
front door .... We'll teach these magnates that they cannot
ride roughshod over the rights of the commoners, confound
them! And I've closed the wood where the Fernworthy folk
used to picnic. These infernal people seem to think that there
are no rights of property, and that they can swarm where they
like with their papers and their bottles. Both cases decided, Dr.
Watson, and both in my favour. I haven't had such a day since
I had Sir John Morland for trespass because he shot in his own
warren.
WATSON: How on earth did you do that?
FRANKLAND: Look it up in the books, sir. It will repay reading-Franklandv. Morland, Court of Queens Bench. It cost
me £200, but I got my verdict.
WATSON: Did it do you any good?
FRANKLAND: None, sir, none. I am proud to say that I had
14. A.C. DOYLE, The Hound of the Baskervilles, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HoMES
783 (Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1936).
15. Id. at 836.
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no interest in the matter. I act entirely from a sense of public
duty. 1

16. Id. at 863.
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